Cloud forensics encompasses various computing-as-a-service models, including IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. It presents challenges in terms of acquisition, analysis, attribution, legal status, and contractual issues with the Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The cloud infrastructure introduces an additional layer of complexity in data attribution, as it can span multiple physical locations. Even in IaaS scenarios where users lack control over the underlying infrastructure, traditional acquisition procedures become impractical for investigators.
Depending on the cloud service model, the levels of access may vary:
- SaaS: cloud service provider only one who has logs/data access
- PaaS: customer may have application log, network log, database log, or operating system depend on the CSP policy and the service model
- IaaS: logs until OS level accessible to customers; network/process logs at provider level (e.g. load balancer logs) and physical access to the server is not possible
In the cloud environment, the real issue is the data in flux, as some data only exists as a result of a transaction. This means that, in some cases, there is no data to be analyzed because all the elements inside of a web page are dynamic and generated on the fly. During the acquisition of a simple web page, many things could go wrong:
- How to capture the dynamic content on the page?
- How to reproduce the page in court?
- If the page is imported from external sites, what is its legal status?
Even the visualization of the data is different from the data itself, because the data could be generated on the fly and not stored in the cloud infrastructure. Another challenge arises in the attribution of data within cyberspace. The already difficult task of attribution is further complicated by IP spoofing and the use of stepping stones. Several factors can hinder data attribution, including DNS resolution (as data may be stored in multiple locations), connectivity and provider identification, and the geolocation of the hosting entity.
The main expectation of forensics is the retrieval of deleted data or fragments of data, but this is basically impossible in a cloud environment. The metadata will disappear easily, and the investigation of hypervisor-level compromises is challenging due to the lack of tools and research. The main issue is the lack of control over the infrastructure, as the CSP has full control over the data and the infrastructure.
Legal Issues
When investigating cloud infrastructure and electronic data, several legal challenges arise, especially concerning jurisdiction and data sovereignty. A primary issue revolves around geographic location. In traditional legal frameworks, criminal investigations and prosecutions are typically tied to specific physical locations, with laws being applicable based on where a crime occurs or where evidence is found. However, electronic data presents a unique challenge because it can be distributed across multiple physical locations, potentially spanning different countries and jurisdictions.
Unlike physical evidence, electronic data stored in the cloud may not reside in a single, identifiable location. It could be fragmented and stored in various data centers across the globe, each under different legal regimes. For instance, a piece of data stored in a cloud service provider’s (CSP) infrastructure might have parts of it in data centers in the United States, Europe, and Asia simultaneously. Each of these regions has its own set of laws governing data storage, privacy, and access, leading to complex legal scenarios. The legal status of the data could vary significantly from one country to another, making it difficult to determine which jurisdiction’s laws apply in a given situation.
Example
For example, data privacy laws in the European Union, governed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), might impose strict limitations on how data can be accessed and used, whereas another country might have more lenient laws. This disparity creates significant challenges for law enforcement agencies attempting to carry out investigations that require accessing or seizing electronic data stored across borders.
International legal frameworks, such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, have been established to address some of these challenges. The Budapest Convention supports the concept of “Electronic Search and Seizure,” allowing for the collection and preservation of electronic evidence across borders. However, it does not fully resolve the issue of cross-border legal obstacles. For instance, one country cannot unilaterally order the removal of data or access to it in another country without going through the proper legal channels, such as mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). This process can be time-consuming and complex, often hindering timely investigations.
Another legal issue arises from the contracts and service-level agreements (SLAs) between organizations and cloud service providers. These agreements often specify the geographic locations where data may be stored, but they may not fully address the legal complexities associated with these locations. For example, a CSP might store data in multiple countries to ensure redundancy and availability, but the customer may not be fully aware of the legal implications of this arrangement. Organizations must carefully review their contracts and SLAs to understand where their data is stored and what legal protections are in place. They should also consider the potential impact of data being subject to different laws in different jurisdictions. Failure to do so could result in legal exposure, especially if data is seized or accessed by foreign governments under laws that the organization did not anticipate.
Forensically-enabled clouds
One of the requirements for a CSP is to offer “forensic-friendly” services, and this could be achieved by storing snapshots of volatile VM data in their infrastructure, providing proof of past data possession, data location, identity management, encryption and key management, legal provision, and SLAs.
DORA Law
The DORA law (Digital Online Record Access) requires that CSPs provide a mechanism for law enforcement to access data in a timely manner. This is important because the data could be stored in multiple locations, and the legal status of the data could be different in each country.
Another important aspect is to provide drivers: SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) requires auditable storage for financial and accounting data, and HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) requires forensic capabilities for storage of healthcare data. This is important because nowadays the data storage size is constantly increasing, and the analysis of large amounts of data takes months or years on standard computing hardware. So, having forensically-enabled clouds could make the analysis of large amounts of data easier and faster.
The main benefits of cloud-enabled forensics are large-scale data storage, large-scale computing infrastructure, and the reuse of computing concepts. The challenges are the loss of control on evidence, chain of custody, and transnational operations from a legal perspective.